The Supreme Court and the Quality of Political Dialogue. by Maltz, Earl M.
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUALITY 
OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE 
Earl M Maltz* 
The search for a "neutral" principle to justify the exercise of 
nonoriginalist judicial review has generated much of the immense 
literature on constitutional law. In the 1970s, most nonoriginalist 
theorists argued that judges were well-positioned to enforce funda-
mental moral values.' John Hart Ely then entered the fray, dramat-
ically changing the terms of the debate with a powerful attack on 
such theories, together with a proposal that the courts adopt a "rep-
resentation-reinforcement" approach.2 Ely's model in turn was 
subjected to an avalanche of criticism.J Recently, dialogue theories 
have become increasingly prominent. These theories contend that 
judges can use constitutional rulings to enrich public debate over 
fundamental rights. 
This article will challenge the claims of the dialogue theorists. 
The article will begin by describing the evolution of the dialogue 
analysis. It will then briefly outline the criteria by which dialogue 
theories should be judged, and conclude that they fail to satisfy 
these criteria. 
I 
While not new,4 dialogue theory has experienced a resurgence 
in recent years. In part, this renaissance derives from the difficulties 
with theories that rest on very strong claims about the institutional 
competence of judges. Those theories begin with the assertion that 
the nonjudicial [hereinafter "political"] branches of government are 
• Professor of Law, Rutgers University. 
I. See, e.g., Perry, Abonion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power, 23 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 689 (1976); Sandal ow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 ( 1977); 
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adju-
dication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). 
2. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
3. Two major symposia provide excellent examples of this criticism. Constitutional 
Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981); Judicial Review Versus 
Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. I (1981). 
4. See Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REv. 193, 
208 (1952). 
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likely to slight fundamental values. Different commentators define 
the relevant values differently; all, however, agree that in the ab-
sence of judicial review, legislatures are unlikely to give these values 
appropriate weight in the lawmaking process. Generally, the ra-
tionale is expressed in institutional terms; because of the nature of 
their position judges are viewed as having a unique perspective on 
the public policy issues which come before them. This judicial per-
spective is said to be best expressed through the exercise of non-
originalist judicial review.s 
Professor Owen Fiss typifies the scholars who make the strong-
est claims based on these considerations. Unlike legislatures, which 
"see their primary function in terms of registering the actual, occur-
rent preferences of the people," Fiss contends that courts are seen as 
"ideologically committed [and] institutionally suited to search for 
the meaning of constitutional values."6 He argues that because of 
this difference, judges are uniquely qualified to be the final arbiters 
on issues involving fundamental social values. 
In assessing this claim, one might ask whether the results gen-
erated by such review have in fact advanced fundamental values. 
Unfortunately, no clear answer exists. First, there is no consensus 
on the proper content of fundamental values themselves. While 
some mainstream groups hale Roe v. Wade1 as a vindication of fun-
damental rights for women, others (also well within the political 
mainstream) revile the decision as inconsistent with respect for 
human life. Second, even if a consensus about fundamental values 
existed, the results reached by different courts often point in quite 
different directions. Obviously, for example, Dred Scott v. Sanford 8 
had implications that were quite different from those of Brown v. 
Board of Education 9 for the theory that American society should be 
based on the concept of racial equality. In short, the claim that in 
the long run the courts will generate better results than the legisla-
ture is at best unproven. 
Seeking to avoid this problem, dialogue theorists make a 
weaker claim regarding a court's competence. These theorists do 
not claim that the judiciary will make better decisions on funda-
mental issues. They argue simply that nonoriginalist review im-
proves the decisionmaking process by adding a different, distinctive 
5. Eg., Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Founeenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. 
REv. 981 (1979); Richards, Moral Philosophy and the Search for Fundamental Values in 
Constitutional Law, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 319 (1981). 
6. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. I, 10 (1979). 
7. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
8. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
9. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
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voice to the dialogue which ultimately creates governmental policy. 
This position derives from a view of the interaction between the 
courts and other branches of government which was perhaps best 
articulated by the late Alexander Bickel: 
Virtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court are the beginnings of 
conversations between the Court and the people and their representatives. They are 
never, at the start, conversations between equals. The Court has an edge, because it 
initiates things with some immediate action, even if limited. But conversations they 
are, and to say that the Supreme Court lays down the law of the land is to state the 
ultimate result, following upon a complex series of events, in some cases, and in 
others it is a form of speech only.IO 
Taken alone, Bickel's conception simply describes the impact 
of judicial review on the overall decisionmaking process of govern-
ment. Others, however, have elaborated on the concept in an at-
tempt to justify judicial activism. The argument of Professor 
Michael J. Perry is typical: 
In the constitutional dialogue between the Court and the other agencies of govern-
ment-a subtle, dialectical interplay between Court and polity-what emerges is a 
far more self-critical political morality than would otherwise appear, and therefore 
likely a more mature political morality as well-a morality that is moving (inch-
ing?) toward, even though it has never always and everywhere arrived at, right 
answers, rather than a stagnant or even regressive morality. II 
Similar themes can be found in the work of a number of other 
commentators.12 
Death-penalty law provides an excellent example of the process 
envisioned by those who embrace the Bickel/Perry model of judi-
cial review. In 1972, a majority of the Supreme Court invoked the 
eighth amendment to strike down all then- existing capital punish-
ment statutes in Furman v. Georgia.n While two members of the 
five-Justice Furman majority would have found capital punishment 
unconstitutional per se,14 the other three limited their opinions to 
the specific statutes before them.ls 
In response to Furman, many states reinstituted capital pun-
ishment but modified the procedures for determining when the im-
10. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME CoURT AND TliE IDEA OF PROGRESS 177 (1970). 
II. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE CoURTS AND HUMAN RiGHTS 113 (1982). 
12. Rg., P. BoBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: A THEORY OF THE CoNSTITUTION 
182-83 (1982); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 
1013, 1047-49 (1984); Sadurski, Conventional Morality and Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L. 
REv. 339, 397 (1987). See generally Nagel, Rationalism in Constitutional Law, 4 CoNST. 
COMM. 9, 15 (1987). 
13. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
14. /d. at 257-306 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 314-74 (opinion of Marshall, J-). 
15. /d. at 240-57 (opinion of Douglas, J.); id at 306-10 (opinion of Stewart, J.); id. at 
310-14 (opinion of White, J.). 
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position of the death penalty was appropriate. Beginning in 1976, 
the Court considered the revised schemes, finding some constitu-
tional and some not.I6 As states gradually conformed their legisla-
tive and judicial procedures to the decisions of the Court, the death 
penalty reemerged as a fact of American life. The formal prerequi-
sites for imposition of the penalty were, however, quite different 
from those which had governed the pre-Furman era. 
Rather plainly, the Court did engage in a dialogue with the 
state legislatures on the death-penalty issue. Such a dialogue takes 
place even when-as in the context of school prayerl7-the Court 
does not change its ultimate conclusion. As Herbert Wechsler has 
pointed out, "[t]o say that [the Court] initiates a dialogue is not, of 
course, to say that it is necessarily attentive to its critics."Is The 
point is that constitutional decisions are not set in stone; if criti-
cisms from the populace and other branches of government are suf-
ficiently cogent, the Court may be persuaded to change its position. 
The mere existence of a dialectical relationship does not neces-
sarily justify nonoriginalist activism. Dialogue theorists must also 
demonstrate that such activism improves the overall quality of the 
debate. The remainder of this article will challenge the assumptions 
which underlie that assertion. 
II 
In assessing the impact of constitutional activism on the polit-
ical process, dialogue theories seem to proceed from an inaccurate 
perception of the position which courts would occupy in a noncon-
stitutional world. They apparently assume that in the absence of 
judicial review, the courts would have little input into the govern-
mental debate over major ethical questions. This assumption ig-
nores the impact of judicial decisions in common-law and statutory 
contexts. Although legal conventions clearly have a strong impact 
on nonconstitutional rulings, such decisions are also often strongly 
influenced by ethical arguments. 
The interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
196419 illustrates this point in a statutory context. Among the is-
sues raised by Title VII were first, the question of whether the stat-
ute prohibits discrimination against pregnant workers, and second, 
16. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976). 
17. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421 (1962). 
18. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (1965). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). 
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the role of discriminatory impact in the statutory analysis. On both 
issues, a true dialogue took place between Congress and the 
Supreme Court. 
The Court first addressed the pregnancy issue in General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert. 20 Employees challenged a disability plan which 
excluded pregnancy from its coverage. Speaking for the majority, 
Justice Rehnquist argued that the plan did not discriminate "on the 
basis of sex." Instead, he said it distinguished between pregnant 
persons and nonpregnant persons (both male and female).21 Thus 
the majority concluded that the discrimination did not violate Title 
VII. 
Congress responded to Gilbert by passing the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 1978 [the Pregnancy Act],22 which provides 
that-
(t)he terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include ... because of or on the 
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women a1fected by 
pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, in-
cluding receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so 
a1fected but similar in their ability or inability to work .... 
The full import of this provision was made clear in Newport News 
Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. v. EEOC.23 After the passage of the 
Pregnancy Act, the employer in Newport News had amended its 
health benefit plan to provide coverage for pregnancy-related ex-
penses of female employees, but not for those of the spouses of male 
employees. Tracking Rehnquist's argument in Gilbert, the em-
ployer argued that male employees were discriminated against not 
because of their sex, but rather because they themselves could not 
become pregnant. Under this interpretation the Pregnancy Act ap-
peared only to overrule the specific holding in Gilbert, merely guar-
anteeing that female employees would be entitled to medical 
benefits for pregnancy-related conditions. Rejecting this approach, 
the Newport News majority concluded that Congress intended to 
overturn the theory underlying Gilbert- that pregnancy-based dis-
crimination was not sex discrimination.24 Thus, the employer's ex-
clusion of coverage for spousal pregnancies was found to be illegal 
sex discrimination. 
The development of the law of disparate impact reflects a 
somewhat different dynamic. The original legislative history of Ti-
20. 429 u.s. 125 (1976). 
21. Id. at 137-40. 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1976 & Supp. V). 
23. 462 U.S. 669 (1983). 
24. Id. at 684-85. 
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tie VII on this point contains substantial evidence that Congress 
intended to prohibit only intentional discrimination.zs Nonetheless, 
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,z6 the Court held that because an em-
ployment test disqualified blacks in disproportionate numbers, the 
test could not be used absent a showing of "business necessity." 
When amending Title VII in 1972, Congress acquiesced in this 
interpretation.21 
The treatments of the pregnancy and disparate impact issues 
illustrate two patterns in the nonconstitutional dialogue between the 
courts and the legislature. In both cases, Congress initiated the dia-
logue by passing Title VII. The Supreme Court then addressed one 
of the basic moral issues inherent in the Title VII language: in one 
case, the definition of discrimination on the basis of sex, and in an-
other, the disparate impact issue. On the pregnancy issue, Congress 
responded by adopting a different definition of sex discrimination, 
and the Court deferred to the congressional definition; on the dispa-
rate impact issue, Congress adopted the Court's approach. But in 
each case the ultimate legal resolution of the moral issue emerged 
after a conversation between the legislative and judicial branches.zs 
The key difference between this dialogue and that created by 
constitutional decisionmaking is that in the statutory context it is 
clearly the legislature rather than the judiciary which has the last 
word.29 One can, of course, argue that constitutional judgments are 
not always the last word on moral issues. Still, such judgments can-
not be overturned by the ordinary legislative process. Moreover, 
the mere fact that a court chooses to speak in the name of the Con-
stitution adds tremendously to the effect of its conclusions on the 
debate. 
Thus the effect of constitutionally-based judicial activism is not 
to allow courts to participate in the debate over moral issues, but 
rather to give judges an enormous advantage over other participants 
25. See, e.g., 100 Cong. Rec. 7247 (1964). 
26. 401 u.s. 424 (1971). 
27. See Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REv. 
945, 982-83 (1982); Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 688, 719 & 
nn.186-87 (1980). 
28. Admittedly, the opportunity for the federal courts to participate in the dialogue 
over the proper shape of state law is more limited. The federal courts do, however, have 
some voice in this dialogue through the exercise of diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, a strong 
judicial voice is heard through the medium of the state courts. 
29. Of course, even in the statutory context, the judiciary has a tremendous influence on 
the ultimate conclusion. The Griggs example demonstrates this point quite clearly. Once the 
courts have interpreted a statute, that interpretation can only be overturned by a concerted 
legislative effort. Moreover, the mere fact that the judiciary has issued an interpretation may 
make such an effort more difficult to mount; that interpretation will carry a certain moral 
force which can have the effect of deterring attempts at legislative change. 
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in the debate. It is this added advantage that dialogue theorists 
must justify. 
The establishment of such a judicial advantage can only be jus-
tified if two conditions are satisfied. First, the judges must bring a 
unique perspective to the debate over fundamental issues of public 
policy. Second, there must be some reason to believe that that per-
spective is somehow superior to that of other governmental deci-
sionmakers, and thus leads to an improvement in the overall 
decisionmaking process. An examination of representative case law 
demonstrates that neither of those conditions exists in the real 
world. 
III 
The judicial treatment of the problem of voluntary affirmative 
action programs provides an excellent case study of the impact of 
judicial activism on the quality of debate. Affirmative action plans 
imposed remedially by lower courts have generally survived scru-
tiny by the Supreme Court;30 the major battleground involves the 
right of other government agencies to adopt such plans in the ab-
sence of a judicial mandate. Basically, the Court has developed its 
position through opinions in three cases: Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke,Jt Fullilove v. Klutznick,Jz and Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education.JJ 
Bakke was perhaps the most ballyhooed constitutional case 
since Brown v. Board of Education. The medical school of the Uni-
versity of California at Davis had reserved 16 of the 100 places in 
each entering class for disadvantaged members of minority groups. 
by a five to four vote, the Court held that the specific affirmative 
action program was unlawful. Four members of the majority based 
their conclusion entirely on statutory grounds.34 Of the five Justices 
who addressed the constitutional issue, only Justice Powell found 
the challenged program objectionable. 
Powell began by asserting that all racial classifications should 
be subject to strict scrutinyJs-a conclusion joined by Justice 
White.J6 Powell identified two state interests which were poten-
tially of sufficient magnitude to merit the use of a racial classifica-
30. See, e.g., Local Number 93, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 
U.S. SOl (1986); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 41 (1986). 
31. 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
32. 448 u.s. 448 (1980). 
33. 476 u.s. 267 (1986). 
34. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408-21 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
35. /d. at 291 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
36. /d. at 267. 
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tion: redressing past discriminationJ7 and maintaining diversity 
within the student body.Js He argued that the Board of Regents 
was an "isolated segment of our vast governmental structure" 
which lacked the necessary institutional competence to address 
problems of past discrimination.39 He contended, moreover, that 
the interest in diversity could be served by a less drastic means, 
namely, the simple consideration of race as a factor in the admis-
sions process.40 Powell therefore concluded that while some consid-
eration of race in the admissions process was constitutionally 
permissible, the use of a quota was not. 
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun rejected the 
use of traditional strict scrutiny; they did, however, conclude that 
scrutiny of affirmative action programs should be "strict and 
searching" and that even compensatory racial classifications must 
be substantially related to important government objectives.4t Un-
like Powell, they viewed the Davis plan as an appropriate vehicle to 
remedy past discrimination. 42 Because the Davis plan also did not 
stigmatize any racial group, the Brennan group opinion concluded 
that the plan was constitutionally permissible. 
Fullilove was a facial challenge to a provision in the Public 
Works Employment Act of 1977 which required that, in the ab-
sence of an administrative waiver, ten percent of the federal funds 
granted for local projects be allocated to businesses owned by mem-
bers of specified minority groups. By a 6-3 vote, the Court held that 
this program did not violate the equal protection component of the 
due process clause of the fifth amendment. 43 
The six member majority split into two groups. Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Blackmun essentially reaffirmed the principles 
which they had espoused in Bakke.44 By contrast, writing for him-
self, Justice White, and Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger pro-
duced a remarkable opinion which, while noting the need for "close 
examination" of all race-based classifications,4s failed to specify the 
37. /d. at 307-10. 
38. /d. at 311-19. 
39. /d. at 309-10. 
40. /d. at 315-19. 
41. /d. at 356-62 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). 
42. /d. at 369-72. 
43. The Court has held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment imposes 
constraints on the federal government which are generally similar to those imposed on the 
states by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See. e.g., Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
44. Fullilove v. K.lutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517 (Marshall, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
45. /d. at 472 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). 
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standard of review to be applied. 46 Burger repeatedly emphasized 
that special deference was due to congressional decisions regarding 
remedies for past discrimination,47 a theme which Justice Powell 
also stressed in his separate concurrence.4B In this context, the Bur-
ger opinion concluded that the minority set-aside program was 
facially constitutional. The opinion left open the possibility, how-
ever, that the failure to grant an administrative waiver in a specific 
case might be unconstitutional.49 
The dissenters also split into two groups. Justices Rehnquist 
and Stewart concluded that all racial classification were unconstitu-
tionai.so Justice Stevens, on the other hand, portrayed the set-aside 
program as the product of a simple political tradeoff which failed to 
address the difficult problems which he viewed as inherent in the 
use of any racial classification.s1 Contending that when such a clas-
sification is adopted "[i]t is up to Congress to demonstrate that its 
unique statutory preference is justified by a relevant characteristic 
that is shared by the members of the preferred class,"s2 Stevens ar-
gued that this burden had not been carried in Fullilove. 
The recent decision in Wygant completes the picture. There 
the Court considered the constitutionality of a provision in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement governing layoffs of teachers. Crafted 
against the background of chronic minority representation in the 
workforce, the agreement provided that such layoffs were to pro-
ceed according to seniority "except that at no time will there be a 
greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current 
percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the lay-
off." The effect of the proviso was that whites with greater seniority 
would sometimes be laid off before minorities with less seniority. 
By a 5-4 vote, the Court found this provision to be unconstitutional. 
Once again, the majority could not coalesce around any single 
opinion. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist, prepared the plurality opinion. Powell first reaffirmed 
his view that strict scrutiny should be applied to all cases of racial 
discrimination. sJ He then dismissed the notion that the racial pref-
erence could be used to ensure that blacks would have appropriate 
46. Id. at 492 ("[t]his opinion does not adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the formu-
las adopted in such cases as [Bakke]"). 
47. /d. at 472-73. 
48. See id. at 499-502 {opinion of Powell, J.). 
49. /d. at 486. 
50. Id. at 522. 
51. /d. at 541-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
52. Id. at 554. 
53. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (I 986) {opinion of Powell, 
J.). 
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role models.s4 Powell did concede that the school board might 
properly use racial classifications as a remedy for past discrimina-
tion by the school board itself,ss but he doubted that the school 
board had produced the "convincing evidence" of past discrimina-
tion necessary to justify the use of race as a factor.s6 He also con-
cluded that subjecting whites to layoffs was an unduly intrusive 
means of serving the compelling interests7-a point which also 
formed the basis of White's brief concurrence.ss Thus Powell found 
the classification unconstitutional. 
Justice O'Connor disagreed with Justice Powell on two impor-
tant points. First, she concluded that a pattern of minority under-
representation alone could support an inference of past 
discrimination and thus provide the basis for the use of a racial clas-
sification as a remedial measure.s9 Second, she explicitly reserved 
the question of whether a system of race-based layoffs could ever be 
constitutional, arguing instead that the standard used by the school 
board to determine the appropriate level of minority representation 
was inappropriate.60 
Dissenting, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun once 
again reaffirmed the principles enunciated in their Bakke opinion, 
concluding that the school board had given valid reasons for the 
layoff provision.6t In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice Ste-
vens relied on three points for his conclusion: the challenged provi-
sion served a valid public purpose, it was adopted through a fair 
procedure, and it was given a narrow breadth. 62 
Although the outcome of affirmative action litigation points in 
a political direction that is different from most contemporary judi-
cial activism, the structure of the decisionmaking process is in many 
ways typical of the Burger/Rehnquist era. The Justices are unable 
to unite on bold, clear principles; instead, the plethora of opinions 
reflects a wide diversity of viewpoints. The resulting pattern of ac-
tivism (and nonactivism) has been described as "rootless" by one 
noted commentator.6J In fact, the pattern is probably better de-
scribed as multirooted. Unlike the Warren Court, which essentially 
54. /d. at 274-76. 
55. /d. at 277. 
56. /d. at 277-78. 
57. /d. at 279-84. 
58. /d. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
59. /d. at 292 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). 
60. /d. at 293. 
61. /d. at 295 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
62. /d. at 313. 
63. Blasi, The Rootless A.ctMsm of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER CoURT: THE 
CoUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 198-217 (V. Blasi ed. 1983). 
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lacked representation from the conservative wing of mainstream 
American politics, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have elements 
from all major sectors of the national political scene. Voices from 
each of these sectors thus contribute to the decisions of the Court to 
intervene (or not to intervene) on particular issues, with centrist 
Justices holding the balance of power. It is thus not surprising that 
the overall performance of the Court is not easily identified with 
any clearly- defined ideological position. 
While this spirit of moderation might be in some senses admi-
rable, it does little to provide legal guidance to government officials 
facing affirmative action issues. Consider the situation of a govern-
ment decisionmaker who is considering adoption of a race-con-
scious affirmative action program. Presumably one would want 
that decisionmaker to weigh the various interests involved and then 
to decide tentatively upon a program which she feels would best 
accommodate the competing interests. This program would then be 
modified to meet potential constitutional objections. 
Confronted with current legal doctrine, our decisionmaker has 
severe problems. She can be certain that Justice Rehnquist would 
vote to strike down any program which she adopted; conversely, 
she could be fairly confident of support from Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, and Blackmun. the decisionmaker would then be con-
fronted with the necessity of satisfying the varying requirements of 
two of the five remaining Justices. Moreover, each of the separate 
standards is itself somewhat amorphous; indeed, in Bakke Justice 
White professed allegiance to two different standards in the same 
case. 
The decisionmaker is thus faced with an extremely difficult sit-
uation-even leaving aside the possibility that the balance on the 
Court might shift because of a change in personnel. Admittedly she 
can take certain steps to improve the chances that her affirmative 
action program will survive intact; for example, whatever her true 
motives, if the program involves education she can state explicitly 
that it is designed to foster "diversity." But the decisionmaker can 
never be certain that a race-conscious initiative will survive judicial 
scrutiny. Indeed, if she guesses wrong in the position of even one 
Justice, the decisionmaker will be left with no affirmative action 
program at all. Such uncertainty must necessarily have a destruc-
tive impact on the decisionmaking process of the other branches of 
government. 
The adverse effect of judicial diversity on other decisionmakers 
poses a major problem for dialogue theorists. At the same time, 
however, this diversity should highlight the claimed advantages of 
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judicial participation in the policymaking process. Certainly the de-
bate is most strongly enriched when the best arguments from all 
sides are heard. Since the Justices on the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts reflect a broad spectrum of opinion on the relevant issues, if 
basic dialogue theory is correct one would expect a particularly 
strong contribution to the discussion of important issues. 
Unfortunately, one searches in vain for novel moral insights in 
the myriad opinions dealing with the affirmative action issue. Often 
these opinions focus only on distinctively legal points rather than 
more basic moral questions. As one might expect from a group of 
nine lawyers, the opinions spend a great deal of time discussing 
legal concepts such as standard of review and burden of proof. But 
sparring over verbal formulations hardly advances one's under-
standing of the ethical problems raised in the cases; indeed, such 
formulations often tend to obscure rather than elucidate the basic 
issues.64 
Further, even when the Justices do address fundamental moral 
issues, their handling of these issues does not generally reflect any 
particularly strong insight. The majority opinion in Roe provides a 
classic example. Admittedly, one unfamiliar with the history of the 
long-running debate over abortion might gain some knowledge 
from the opinion.6s Even the strongest defender of the result, how-
ever, would not characterize Justice Blackmun's handling of the 
great mass of evidence as particularly adroit. Similarly, the affirma-
tive action opinions simply recapitulate the arguments which one 
might find in any legislative debate. 
The failure of the members of the Supreme Court to exhibit 
any particularly moral insight should not be surprising. Appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court reflects none of the characteristics that 
one would normally associate with such insight; instead, it requires 
only that the appointee (a) be well connected politically; (b) share 
the same basic political philosophy as the president who appoints 
him; and (c) (if the appointment is to be considered a "good" one) 
have demonstrated mastery of the technique of manipulating the 
distinctive principles of legal analysis. Legislators have essentially 
64. One finds clear examples of this phenomenon in both the abortion and affinnative 
action cases. For example, in urging rejection of the constitutional attack in Roe, Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent relied almost entirely on the need for the courts to defer to legislative 
judgments. Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Fullilove rests on the same type of 
argument. Conversely, the lynchpin of Justice Stewart's dissent in Fullilove is the originalist 
argument that the drafters of the fourteenth amendment intended that all race-based classifi-
cations be held unconstitutional. None of these opinions makes any serious attempt to come 
to grips with the fundamental issues underlying the adoption of the measures before the 
Court. 
65. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973). 
1988] DIALOGUE THEORIES 387 
the same qualifications except for legal expertise. As already noted, 
such expertise may actually deflect judges from the underlying 
moral issues raised by a case. 
Perhaps cognizant of this problem, dialogue theorists typically 
depend on the institutional position of judges rather than their per-
sonal qualifications. The basic concept is that the judiciary brings a 
"neutral" view to these questions, while legislative consideration is 
tainted by political considerations. Ronald Dworkin captures the 
essence of this view. 
Judicial review insures that the most fundamental issues of political morality will 
finally be set out and debated as issues of principle and not simply as issues of 
political power, a transformation that cannot succeed, in any case not fully, within 
the legislature itself. 
[It] call[ed] some issues from the battleground of power politics to the forum of 
principle. It holds out the promise that the deepest, most fundamental confiicts 
between individual and society will once, someplace, finally, become questions of 
justice.66 
The suggestion is that because judges are insulated from short-term 
political pressures, their approach to fundamental moral issues will 
differ substantially from that of other governmental actors. 
In a limited sense this observation is accurate. Judges are less 
likely than legislators to take into account the attitudes of their 
political supporters in making critical decisions. But this does not 
imply that judges are in any meaningful sense neutral on basic 
moral issues; like those of other governmental actors, judicial deci-
sions on these issues can only reflect fundamental beliefs about basic 
issues. The major difference is simply that while the decision of a 
legislator must consider the positions of a wide variety of persons, 
judges can consult only their own political/ethical/moral biases 
without fear of reprisal. Of course, one can appeal to a judge to 
ignore his personal ethical system and be guided instead by some 
"higher" value; but there is no certainty or even likelihood that he 
will be guided by such values if they are in conflict with his own 
beliefs. Thus, judicial activism will have the likely effect of magni-
fying the importance of the views of a small number of government 
officials-judges-all of whom are members of the governing elite 
in any event. Depending on the respective orientations of judges 
and legislators, this shift in power may change the ultimate out-
come; at the same time, however, it cannot be said to constitute a 
general improvement in the quality of the decisionmaking process 
itself. 
66. Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 517-18 (1981). 
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IV 
The inability of judges to contribute uniquely to public debate 
undermines dialogue theory. An even more serious criticism is that, 
because of its impact on the legislative process, judicial activism ac-
tually damages the quality of the debate over fundamental moral 
questions. Due to the near-mythic stature of the Supreme Court in 
American society, the simple assertion that a position is unconstitu-
tional-i.e., inconsistent with the announced doctrine of the 
Court-is considered a sufficient response to any political argu-
ment. The result is that opponents of the policy are largely relieved 
of the responsibility for developing their own moral justification. 
The abortion controversy illustrates this point. If a pro-life 
legislator introduced a bill to ban all abortions, pro-choice oppo-
nents would have no need to enter into an extended discussion of 
the moral justifications for the bill. Instead, they could simply cite 
Roe v. Wade and contend (correctly) that the proposal was uncon-
stitutional. Rather than a serious moral discussion, the debate 
could thus be reduced to a matter of citation of legal authority. 
Further, even when the Court's position is more equivocal, the 
vagaries of legal doctrine can divert attention from fundamental 
moral questions. Here the death-penalty cases are illustrative. As 
already noted, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty is constitutional under some circum-
stances.67 At the same time, however, the Court has developed a 
complex set of procedural and substantive rules which circumscribe 
legislative discretion in this area. Death-penalty opponents need 
not rest their criticism of a specific bill on basic moral arguments 
dealing with the central issue. Instead, they can also rely on what 
might be aptly labeled constitutional trivia-the procedural details 
governing the conditions under which the penalty may be imposed. 
Indeed, the debate over these details has played a large part in the 
discussions of the issue within the Court itself. 6s 
The abortion cases illustrate another way in which judicial ac-
tivism can damage the quality of political debate. As virtually every 
literate American knows, in 1973 the Supreme Court entered the 
controversy over abortion with its sweeping decisions in Roe v. 
Wade69 and Doe v. Bo/ton.'o Speaking for the majority, Justice 
Blackmun enunciated the famous trimester analysis. Initially, the 
67. See sources cited at n.16, supra. 
68. For a typical example, see the various opinions in Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978). 
69. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
70. 410 u.s. 179 (1973). 
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vagueness of some of the standards set out in Roe 71-particularly 
those which related to second trimester abortions-generated the 
same type of uncertainty inherent in the affirmative action cases. 
Resolution of constitutional challenges to early post-Roe abortion 
regulations often rested not on the basic moral issues underlying the 
abortion debate, but rather on detailed factual determinations 
which related narrowly to the specific regulation challenged. For 
example, in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, n the state of Missouri 
attempted to outlaw the saline amniocentesis method during the 
second trimester, declaring that procedure to be "deleterious to ma-
terial health." The decision to strike down this regulation rested on 
the disputed factual conclusion that the prostaglandin method was 
unavailable in Missouri. Obviously, any legislation passed in such 
an atmosphere faced an uncertain future. 
Subsequent decisions have, however, eliminated much of the 
initial uncertainty. The recent decisions in Akron v. Akron Center 
for Reproductive Health, Inc. 73 and Thornburgh v. American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists14 have made clear the point that 
for a majority of the current Court, virtually all regulations of sec-
ond trimester abortions for adults are unacceptable. Indeed, these 
cases strike down even some third trimester restrictions. Thus, 
while some uncertainty remains, the basic message to the state legis-
latures is clear-do not attempt to regulate first and second trimes-
ter abortion. 
Obviously, these decisions have imposed important limitations 
on the outcomes which may be generated by the political process. 
These limitations clearly favor the pro- choice position. Roe and its 
progeny have, also changed the political process in other ways. Fo-
cusing on the legitimating impact of decisions such as Roe, some 
have suggested that these changes have also favored the pro-choice 
forces. 1s In fact, the overall impact of the abortion decisions on the 
political dialogue has been more ambiguous. 
To understand this ambiguity, one must begin by examining 
the state of the abortion debate prior to the Supreme Court's entry 
into the picture. In the five years prior to the Roe decision, the state 
71. Roe held that in the first trimester of pregnancy the state could not prevent the 
performance of abortions by physicians; in the second trimester the state was allowed to 
"regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health"; and 
in the third trimester the state could totally proscribe all abortions except those which are 
necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. 
72. 428 u.s. 52 (1976). 
73. 462 u.s. 416 (1983). 
74. 476 u.s. 747 (1986). 
75. See Jackson & Vinovskis, Public Opinion, Elections and the "Single Issue" Issue, in 
THE ABORTION DISPUTE AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 65-66 (G. Steiner ed. 1983). 
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legislatures had gradually been moving toward the relaxation of the 
requirements for a legal abortion. Five states had adopted the posi-
tion that abortions could be performed for any reason; two others 
allowed abortions to preserve the life or health ofthe mother.76 The 
most popular reform, however, followed the pattern of the Model 
Penal Code, which provided that abortions would be lawful in any 
one of a number of circumstances: if the continuance of the preg-
nancy posed a substantial risk of gravely impairing the physical or 
mental health of the mother, or of ultimately producing a child with 
a grave physical or mental defect; if the pregnancy resulted from 
rape; or if the pregnancy resulted from incest or other felonious in-
tercourse. 77 This pattern of reform (and in some cases lack of re-
form) reflected the classic American legislative process, which often 
generates compromise even on issues which involve deeply-felt 
moral values. 
Roe polarized the debate. The decision inflamed the passions 
of the pro-life forces in particular, making political compromises 
increasingly difficult.7s Moreover, while the decisions of the Court 
in Roe and its progeny have (to at least some extent) put constitu-
tional law into the service of pro-choice values, the pro-life groups 
have often been successful in winning political tests of strength with 
their pro-choice counterparts. The single greatest success of the 
anti-abortion forces came with the passage of the Hyde Amend-
ment. Prior to 1973, federal funds had been available to fund abor-
tions in those instances in which such abortions were legal under 
state law.79 Under the Hyde Amendment, use of federal funds was 
barred except in limited circumstances involving rape and incest in 
those cases in which the life of the mother was threatened. so These 
restrictions were held to be consitutional in Harris v. McRae.st 
Of course, even in the post-McRae world the pro-choice move-
ment is almost certainly in a better legal position than it was prior 
to 1973. The basic point, however, is not one of substance but of 
process. As the abortion cases illustrate, the impact of judicial ac-
tivism on the quality of debate over moral issues is widely uncer-
tain. Thus even from a purely empirical perspective, any 
76. Note, A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion: The Contradic-
tions and Problems, 1972 U. ILL L. F. 177, 179-80 & nn. 27, 29. 
77. See id. at 180 & n.32. 
78. For a detailed examination of the post-Roe activities of the pro-life movement, see 
Pearson & Kurtz, The Abortion Controversy: A Study in Law and Politics, 8 HARV. J.L. & 
Pus. PoL'Y 427 (1985). 
79. See Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975). 
80. Joint Revolution for further Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980 (Hyde Amend-
ment), Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979). 
81. 448 u.s. 297 (1980). 
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justification for judicial review which rests on the perceived need for 
the courts to enter the dialogue is problematic at best. 
The difficulties faced by dialogue theories are endemic to justi-
fications for nonoriginalist activism which rely on the perceived in-
stitutional competence of courts. The major difference between 
judges and legislators is that the former are more strongly influ-
enced by legal conventions in their decisionmaking process. Argu-
ments for nonoriginalist activism urge judges to downplay these 
conventions and address basic moral issues directly. Thus compe-
tence-based theories by their very nature undermine the considera-
tions which purport to give them their force. 
This is not to underestimate potential differences in the respec-
tive answers to fundamental moral questions which would be given 
by the courts and the legislatures. For a variety of reasons, the 
political balance on the Court may be quite different from that in 
Congress and the state legislatures. Further, judicial restraint has 
become a fundamental tenet of most right-center political philoso-
phy in the late twentieth century; thus, on balance judicial activism 
is likely to favor left-center causes. But such potential differences in 
outcome are the result of political happenstance rather than institu-
tional competence. Any plausible constitutional theory must re-
spect this fact. 
